Approved For Release 2001/04/09 : 0777777878-05795A000500110001-9

Address by Mr. Dulles - Project USEFUL Friday, 23 October 1959

It is a great pleasure to be with you today. Like most of us, I am somewhat superstitious and was very glad to see that this exercise had the name of USEFUL. In one of Winston Churchill's books, at one point, he became irritated at the code names given to operations because they would give such names as AGONY, DISASTER, etc. He sent out an order that he himself was going to pass on these names. He refused to accept any names that had a discouraging context; he gave such names as OVERLORD, etc. I have always tried to follow that example--the most difficult and dangerous operation always had a pseudnym that indicated hope and success. The most difficult operation ever engaged in was 'SUCCESS'. So, I welcome you to the conclusion of Project USEFUL and hope that this has been a useful operation for you. I have gone over the agenda and would doubt there is anything I could tell you about the Agency and our work that has not been covered, or could have been omitted in this comprehensive list of subjects and speakers who appeared before you. I would be very glad, however, at the conclusion of my brief remarks to answer any questions that you may want to ask.

I have considered that one of my major tasks here is to see that the relations between CIA and the Armed Services at all levels should be a cooperative one. We are not in competition—we are in coordination and

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cooperation with you, we all serve one Government, and we all have the interests of our country at heart. I have given the watchword to our people that we are not to engage in any petty bickerings in functions and roles, but to make this Agency a cooperative agency in the common cause of the defense of these United States.

When we get into the field of war planning, I sometimes feel that we started out some years ago planning for the last war rather than the next war when it comes. I think maybe we have to review some of our roles and the mission of CIA from that viewpoint.

We have, of course, the field of limited war where many of the lessons we learned from the last war would still be applicable. Then we have the problems of nuclear war which would involve different principles. I have been reviewing some of our staybehind operations, etc., to see if they are realistic. I know that has been considered during the discussions you have been having during this past week. I have also made it a practice myself to visit the overseas commands and to become personally acquainted with the commanders and our relationships in the Pacific and European Theaters, and in the various other theaters of operations.

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As we look toward the future, we face a series of very difficult problems mutually. Naturally, our work and much of your work is beamed toward the problem created by the international Communist Bloc. If you have been trying to analyze recently the effect of the Khrushchev visit--what did he learn, what did we learn, what was the policy that came out of that visit--I am rather inclined to think that Khrushchev did gain some new information on one or two points. In fact, he gained more than what I expected. While he was aware of our potential military, industrial and economic strength, I think he gained a new impression of it on his trip here. In fact, he did say privately that maybe it would take a little bit longer than he had boasted in his statements about his seven-year plan--that around 1970 he would be catching up with us. It will take a good deal longer. While he continues to think that there are a certain number of war mongers in Washington and Government and big business, I think he is convinced that the majority of us want peace and are working for peace. These Approved For Release 2001/04/09: CIA-RDENESSES A000500110001-9

two impressions are a very substantial plus! I think, however, that he has gone back with the idea that he should continue on for a time at least with preaching the necessity of coexistence, and will carry out certain measures to make that more appealing to us. I don't believe that, as we plan our work for the future, we can assume that there has been any change in the over-all outlook of international Communism. I think he realizes that, despite his strength in certain fields of armament, he doesn't want to take on the Free World in an atomic struggle at this time. From reports we have had, word has gotten out through the Communist apparatus to avoid incidents to make us believe that the cold war has been heated up. For the time being, he is going to try other methods while carrying on subversively the same efforts to penetrate. This is especially true in the major effort exerted in Africa. I think the economic program will be stepped up in the future as part of his over-all scheme of international Communism. So, I do not think any of us can relax and lay down our arms. I think he also feels that he can probably get his people, due to the regimentation that exists in the Soviet Union, to work harder than we do. He stated he wasn't impressed with the number of U.S. automobiles -- he didn't want that as they just clutter up the roads. He was going to have taxis. I think he may have the impression we are going a little soft with all the instruments of pleasure that we have. We have so much to do of interest other than our work that we are inclined to have an element of softness. He is going to keep that element away from his people in order to

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control them. That is just a brief picture of that phase of the present situation as I see it and as we analyze it today.

I will close on the remark that we must go ahead and carry on our tasks with even more devotion and vigor than we have in the past.

Thank you very much for this opportunity to be with you.

Question: Do you feel that there are indications that Russia and Khrushchev, in particular, will subscribe to the open inspection program?

Answer: I don't believe so. The one thing that has been impressed upon us and that has come out in the sessions in Geneva, is that there is no indication of any relaxation of their hold on every security precaution they have. You will note that Khrushchev brushed off the suggestion that he see any military installations in the U.S. This included any missile sites, launchings, etc. He also imposed the same restrictions on Kozlov when he was here. The reasons for this are that he knows pretty well what he would see from other sources, and that if he accepts our invitation to visit such installations, he will be under heavy pressure during the President's visit to show an equal amount of their military establishments and installations. He has no intention of doing that. He considers this as secrecy and security and has no intention of showing them except at a very high price. That is an asset that he can hold, and that asset proves that we are pretty much an open

book due to our press. It also indicates that we have given up, to a great Approved For Release 2001/04/09: CIA-RDP78-05795A000500110001-9

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extent, the secrecy and security of our military and other developments. He has been capable of keeping his, and I would be surprised to see any change such as granting open skies.

Question: I think it would be interesting to hear your personal assessment of the man after meeting him socially.

Answer: My meeting socially was very limited. I was at the White House dinner for Khrushchev at the beginning of his trip. As I came along in the receiving line, the President introduced me to Khrushchev.

Mr. Khrushchev, when he saw me, turned and said something to the interpreter. He said, "Oh yes, I know you--I read your reports."

That was no time to get into an argument with him, so I smiled and went on. After dinner, the Vice President introduced me again to Mr. Khrushchev. This time, Mr. Khrushchev said: "I know Dulles-I read your reports." I answered something to the effect that, "I hope you get them legally." Mr. K. answered, "Oh, you know how we get them--we all have the same arrangements." Then I said, "Maybe we should look into this."

As to the impression of the man, we naturally made a careful study of him by analyzing all reports. While not an intellectual giant, he is extremely astute and very quick on the response, very domineering, and somewhat moody. He became tired from time to time; yet, he kept control of himself extremely well. On the whole, I think in Los Angeles,

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Mr. Khrushchev thought it was time to have an outburst and, I believe it was a controlled outburst of anger--particularly on the question of his visiting Disneyland. He thought that here was a good chance because he thought they (meaning the U.S.) wouldn't let him go some place. He felt he got a little bit of an asset to have been denied the privilege of going there. He is in absolute control--more so than his predecessors in the sense that there is no No. 2 man. Kozlov would probably be selected if a predecessor were to be selected. Mr. K. is going at a hard pace. He is not young and is a little bit too stout for the life he is leading. However, we do not think anything is wrong with his health. After all, he follows a schedule that would knock any man down. He is resourceful and quick and doesn't forget the main objective at any time. He is a formidable man.

Question: I have heard that the Russians plan to out-produce us in jet transports and that by 1975, they will be carrying more passengers in jet aircraft than the U.S.

Answer: They are producing the TU-104 which is the commercial type of modern bomber. This is an uneconomical plane as far as fuel is concerned. Yet, they have tried to peddle it around the world. They are endeavoring to develop civil aviation; however, they don't want their people to travel by aircraft. Presently, they are using the

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planes because they haven't developed the roads and because they can control their people who travel in airplanes. I think we are ahead of them in the design and construction of our commercial aircraft—particularly in the point of view of economy of operations. I thank you very much, gentlemen, for the pleasure of talking with you today.